Some argue that GNSS jamming and spoofing are threats that can be relatively easily eliminated. Inertial, vision-based, radar systems, anti-jammers, and GSM can potentially replace it or even eliminate it altogether. But is that really true?
For example, commercial aircraft can effectively operate without satellite navigation because they use: inertial systems, conventional navigation like ILS, VOR, ADF, DME/DME, VOR/DME, VHF communication, and... a human onboard. Great. The problem, however, is that the mentioned systems (except for fully autonomous inertial systems) also communicate, meaning jamming and spoofing could affect them too. For example, VHF communication spoofing, using AI to imitate ATC voices is an increasingly "fashionable" issue.
The principal problem however, is a fact that satellite navigation is not just about positioning. It is also about extreme accurate time (atomic clock) needed for synchronisation. Without synchronization, communication may fail. There are countless examples: from aviation systems like CPDLC to everyday systems such as mobile networks, banking systems, power grids, timestamping in databases, and many more. After all, not everyone can afford to buy an atomic clock...
GNSS has become ubiquitous due to its accessibility (low entry threshold). We remember Gresham's - Copernicus law from economics. The law states that any circulating currency consisting of both "good" and "bad" money quickly becomes dominated by the "bad" money. In our example, this means that what is easily achievable and provides "quick" and measurable benefits will replace more difficult things that require more commitment and money. Such is a human nature. We will not change it.
There is also a widespread belief that GNSS disruption is an issue for regions like the Middle East, Russia, China, Turkey, and increasingly in the Baltic countries, eastern and northern Poland, Slovakia, Romania... At the same time, Western Europe and the USA tend to adopt a more conservative stance (we will describe this conservative behavior in the next article).
Although at the beginning, when the jamming and spoofing become "fashion", people were excited by mass media news. Nowadys, article about spoofed aircraft in Estonia, Finland or Korea became the background for other, more important topics. The same media will return to the subject if something terrible happens. Hopefully not.
We’ve become dependent on GNSS.
We’re connected by satellite systems in almost every area of life. It wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that we’ve avoided a catastrophe in the civilian sphere because today’s attacks are still mostly local (or even "large-scale" in military conflict zones or, as seen in Poland from the border with Ukraine to Kraków), but they are not yet global. In our opinion, this has spared us from chaos and critical failures.
Can GNSS system attacks become global?
Of course, they can. Let's set aside the issue of attacking the satellites themselves for now - these are probably well-protected by governments as their crown jewels.
Due to the widespread nature of the issue and the low entry threshold, a sophisticated jamming attack within a few hundred meters to few kilometers can be carried out with relatively cheap equipment (around $200), while spoofing requires slightly more investment and knowledge, but still remains affordable without state involvement or the need for loans. What does this mean? It means an attack could come from anywhere, at any time, in any place. And, if many attacks happen simultaneously, the problem could become global. The consequences are unpredictable because no one has conducted large-scale tests of this kind.
Together with the master of GNSS monitoring GPSPATRON, we’ve reviewed possible scenarios, and the results are more than shocking - they are almost unbelievable. The vulnerability of all: cheap and expensive, amateur and professional systems to GNSS signal interference is a fact. This isn’t a made-up story.
So is there a panacea?
There’s no simple answer. A solution, panacea for what? For jamming? Yes, we have that. We can buy an anti-jammer. These solutions exist and some are even effective, though they can be quite expensive and have certain limitations. But do we have a solution for spoofing? That’s like asking whether we have a cure for viruses. Today, yes; tomorrow, maybe not. The base of viruses and attack scenarios using jamming is constantly changing and updating.
Therefore, we propose a multi-stage approach.
The first step is raising awareness. We need to determine if the problem affects us, when it affects us, and ultimately, what exactly the problem is. This method, while perhaps not glamorous, is certainly effective and, above all, inexpensive.
We would like to offer, tested and proven on Norway Jammer Test 2024 solution. This method involves spectrum monitoring and threat classification. We offer such services along with training, workshops, and examples. The second step is to see how jamming and spoofing attacks work. We can perform such tests, and you can assess the vulnerabilities in your systems.
To summarise: we still have time to prepare. We have time to check the vulnerabilities of our systems.
This offer is dedicated to airport operators, airlines, telecom network operators, drone show organizers, critical infrastructure managers, bankers, and everyone else who uses GNSS in their systems.
Let’s remember, it’s not an isolated attack, but a global one that will hurt us. Let’s not waste this time, so if you’re interested in this topic, please contact us gnss@dlapilota.pl
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